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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

Wills--Right of an Adopted Child to Take as a
Class Remainderman
T's will devised property to his son, A, for life, then the remainder to the "children" of A in fee simple or, in default of such
remaindermen, to T's other children. T died in 1926. In 1949, A
adopted a son, D. In 1955, the North Carolina adoption statute
was amended, retroactively, to confer upon an adopted child "the
same legal status, including all legal rights and obligations of any
kind whatsoever, as he would have had if he were born the legitimate
child of the adoptive parents .

.

.

."

A died in 1961 and his

brothers and sister brought a declaratory judgment action to determine
the rights of the parties under T's will. Held, under these circumstances the testator did not intend that a child adopted after his
death should share under a provision for surviving children of his
son. Two justices dissented, reasoning that the members of the
class of remaindermen, i.e. A's children, could not be ascertained
until A's death, and at that time D was for all purposes A's child.
Thomas v. Thomas, 129 S.E.2d 239 (N.C. 1963).
Whereas the practice and principles of adoption have been
common in civilizations since the Babylonians compiled the Code
of Hammurabi around 2250 B.C., adoption was viewed somewhat
askance by the Anglo Saxons, perhaps because of adherance to the
principles of consanguinity in the feudal system. Hockaday v. Lynn,
200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906). Adoption being unknown to
the common law and in derogation of it, statutes of adoption have
always been more or less strictly construed as against the adopted
child. Hockaday v. Lynn, supra. It was said, "God only can make
an heir." 3 CoxE UPON LITTLETON [191.a], V.(3.) (1812).

West

Virginia has had provisions for statutory adoption since 1882.
W. Va. Acts, 1882, ch. 132, § 4. The present West Virginia adoption statute, W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 4, § 5 (Michie 1961), enacted in 1959, is quite similar to the subject North Carolina adoption statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (Michie Supp. 1961).
The North Carolina court spoke with optimism in Headen v.
Jackson, 255 N.C. 157, 120 S.E.2d 598 (1961). Thinking that
the 1955 amendment had clarified the rights of the adopted child,
Justice H-iggins quoted from a Survey of Statutory Changes in North
Carolinain 1955, 33 N.C.L. REv. 521, 522 (1955): "Whatever the
problem is concerning an adopted child his standing and his legal
rights can be measured by this clear test: 'What would his standing
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and his rights be if he had been born to his adoptive parents at the
time of adoption?"' Within two years the North Carolina court
had an opportunity to apply this enlightened approach in the instant
case. Justice Higgins found himself writing the dissent to this case
while the majority refused to consider the implications of the
Headen case, distinguishing it as being interpretive of the anti-lapse
statute only.
The "great majority" of cases have been unwilling to confer
class membership upon an adopted child as a "child" or "issue"
under a will of a stranger to the adoption where the adoption occurs
after the testator's death. Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 48, 58 (1962).
The cases are more evenly divided as to membership as "heirs" or
"descendants." Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 84, 91 (1962). Bear in mind,
however, the words of Justice Storey as quoted in Wheeling Dollar
Savings & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va. 703, 708, 37 S.E.2d
563 (1946). ".... Any attempt to classify ... [wills cases], much
less to harmonize them, is full of the most perilous labor. ..."
The combinations of situations which might arise under the
adoption statutes are numerous, and it is far beyond the scope of
this comment to deal with them. The adoption statutes might have
been enacted before or after execution of the will, the testator's
death, the adoption of the child, or the birth of a subsequently born
natural child. The adoption may or may not operate retroactively
or apply to testacy as well as intestacy. The class in question might
be termed children, lawful children, heirs, legal heirs, issue, legal
issue, descendants, direct descendants, lineal descendants, and other
appellations of this sort. Having opened this Pandora's box of possibilities it is difficult to pick up a thread which runs through the
lot. These possibilities are dealt with at length in Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d
12 (1962).
In the instant case, the majority builds its opinion upon the
testator's intent, ascertained from the language of the will considered
in the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time
the will was made. At the time of execution of the will and thereafter until T's death there were no adoption statutes which would
allow an adopted child of A to take under the will, therefore, the
court reasoned, T could not have intended an adopted child to be
a member of the class.
Although it is true that the paramount rule in construing a will
is that the testator's intent controls and must be given effect, Weiss
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v. Soto, 142 W. Va. 783, 98 S.E.2d 727 (1957), the true inquiry
is not what the testator meant to express but what the words he has
used do express. Weiss v. Soto, supra. As in the instant case, some
courts have been so anxious to pick the will from the horns of the
adoption dilemma that they have wholly disregarded another rule
of property-a rule for vesting of contingent remainders at the point
of distribution, thereby giving effect to the testator's expressed
intent. Where T leaves property to A for life, remainder to A's
children as shall be living at A's death, then no one can know who
these children are until A's death. See Nat'l Bank of Fairmont v.
Kenney, 113 W. Va. 890, 895, 170 S.E. 177 (1933). If prior to
A's death the law declares that adopted son D is A's child for all
purposes, it would appear that when the role is called upon A's
death, D should be permitted to answer as a member of the class
of remaindermen unless this was clearly contrary to T's expressed
intent. This is the position of courts which recognize the legislature's
authority to confer all rights within the eye of the law that a natural
child would have had. The Minnesota court puts it this way: "We
have come to realize that it is not the biological act of begetting
offspring-which is done even by animals without any family tiesbut the emotional and spiritual experience of living together that
creates a family." In Re Patrick's Will, 259 Minn. 193, 106
N.W.2d 888 (1960). Accord, In Re Heard's Estate, 49 Cal. App.
2d 514, 319 P.2d 637 (1957); Edmands v. Tice, 324 S.W.2d 491
(Ky. 1958); Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 280 S.W.2d 649
(Mo. 1955); Smith v. Hunter, 86 Ohio St. 106, 99 N.E. 91 (1912);
Vaughn v. Vaughn, 328 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
Apparently the liberal approach is not without its drawbacks;
consider In Re Stanford's Estate, 49 Cal. App.2d 120, 315 P.2d
681 (1957). The court there held that even though, as the default
legatee contended, the purpose of the adoption was to exclude said
legatee from the estate, such purpose would be insignificant as long
as the adoption was valid. 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 441 (1958).
In the instant case, it is anomolous that the majority should
cite Belfield v. Findlay, 389 Ill. 526, 60 N.E.2d 403 (1945), as
presenting the identifical question as was before them. The Belfield
case was decided by applying a statute expressly forbidding an
adopted child from taking property from the lineal kindred of his
adoptive father by right of representation. The Illinois statute was
almost identical to the one confronting the West Virginia court in
Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va. 703,
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37 S.E.2d 563 (1946). Both North Carolina, N.C. Acts, 1955,
ch. 813, § 5, and West Virginia, W. Va. Acts, 1959, ch. 47, have
since amended their statutes so that they now purport to extend
to an adopted child the same legal status as that of a legitimate
child.
In the Stewart case, the West Virginia court looked to the rights
of the adopted child under the adoption statute in constructing the
testator's intent. Unlike the court in the instant case, the West Virginia court applied the statute in effect at the time of adoption.
The West Virginia court impliedly would have admitted the adopted
child to the class of "heirs" or "legal heirs." Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Stewart, supra at 712. There is a split of authority as to which adoption statutes are controlling where the statutes
are not expressly retroactive. Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d 960 (1951).
Recognizing the merit of the progressive minority holding and
the liberal bent of some of the majority, it would appear that the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia might now go either
way in delineating the rights of an adopted child under a stranger's
will. In any event a prudent attorney would be well advised to have
his client expressly state his intent as to adopted children so that the
instrument will not be left to construction in the courts.
Stephen Grant Young

ABSTRACTS
Due Process-Jurisdiction-Minimum Contact Not Satisfied
P, a resident of West Virginia, brought this action for personal
injury sustained from the exploding of a defective pipe which D,
a Texas corporation, sold to a company that used it in its business
in West Virginia. Under W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 1, § 71 (Michie
1961), P obtained substituted service of process and brought this
action in West Virginia. P offered no evidence that D was incorporated in, ever did business in, or ever made a contract to
be performed in West Virginia. D moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. Held, motion to dismiss sustained. Mere commission
of a tort did not establish the necessary "minimum contacts" to
afford jurisdiction; and the West Virginia statute, in conferring jurisdiction over D, resulted in an extraterritorial application of law in
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